此外，捐助者资助的私有化往往伴随着补贴的取消，因为其目标是实现财政的可持续性。这些补贴可能是为了保持低价格。因此，从公用事业服务的角度来看，取消可能意味着提高关税，这样实体可能是经济上可行的私人投资者(Bayliss, 2002)。此外，贫困地区可能没有必要的网络基础设施来促进公用事业服务的提供。此外，安装这种网络的费用可能高得令人望而却步。因此，穷人由于无力支付设置/连接关税而不断被排除在外。Birdsall和Nellis(2003)对私有化对准入的影响持更为乐观的态度。他们认为公用事业的私有化往往会导致进入市场的机会迅速增加，尤其是对城市贫民而言;即使在私有化之后，农村贫困人口通常也会面临持续的排斥。这种准入的增加源于私人利益的战略决策，即扩大市场覆盖面，以增加收入。私有化后扩张的另一个潜在原因是，在面向私人投资者的销售合同中加入了服务和网络扩张条款。从拉丁美洲的角度来看，秘鲁、墨西哥、阿根廷和玻利维亚的私有化增加了穷人的机会(Birdsall and Nellis, 2003)。在市场准入增加之后，价格并未大幅上涨的情况下，私有化对分配产生了积极影响。
Also, donor funded Privatisation is often accompanied by subsidy removals, since the goal is to engender fiscal sustainability. These subsidies may have been serving the purpose of keeping prices low. Hence, from a utility service perspective, removal may mean a hike in tariffs so that the entity may be economically viable for private investors (Bayliss, 2002). In addition, poor residential areas may not have the necessary network infrastructure to facilitate utility service delivery. Further, the installation of such networks can be prohibitively costly. Thus, the poor face continuous exclusion because of their inability to afford the set-up/connection tariffs.Birdsall and Nellis (2003) have a more optimistic disposition on Privatisation’s impact on access. They posit that Privatisation of utilities often leads to a rapid increase in access, especially for the urban poor; the rural poor usually face continued exclusion even after Privatisation. This increase in access results from the strategic decision of private interest to expand market reach, in order to boost revenues. Another potential reason for post-Privatisation expansion is the inclusion of service and network expansion clauses in the sale contracts to private investors. From a Latin American perspective, Privatisation in all of Peru, Mexico, Argentina, and Bolivia, resulted in increased access to the poor (Birdsall and Nellis, 2003). In cases where an increase in access isn’t followed by steep increases in price, Privatisation has a positive distributional impact.