这种进攻概念有严重加剧南亚安全困境动力的种子。这种挑衅性的举动将破坏目前的和平进程，并将局势推向永久性紧张局势。第二，印第安人的这一举措将加剧从常规向核领域升级的风险，从而加剧两者的灾难。在传统领域，冷启动迫使印度部队迅速攻击巴基斯坦，将印巴政府的争端从政治危机的水平推向直接冲突，然后印度政府才能阻止发动进攻。前军队副主席Vigay Vijay Oberoi被认为是冷启动的策划者期望印度政治家有一定的政治意志，认真的有限战争的概念，使政治意愿更可能和情况更不稳定。 总之，我们可以总结冷启动理论肯定会迫使巴基斯坦依靠其战略威慑力量，通过开发战术核武器来填补空白，从而降低核门槛，增加不稳定性。
印度对限制土着铀供应的限制也已根据上述协议得到充分解决，因为她现在可以为那些被保护的反应堆进口铀，从而使她无法将其土着材料转向武器化。根据这项协议给印度的自由不仅构成对裁军和防扩散的严重挑战，而且核能力不断扩大的差距也是威慑稳定的严重威胁。我们没有对我们为战略目的建造新设施的权利施加限制。不幸的是，美国和西部有意或无意地将巴基斯坦置于关于核能力的坚定威胁的局势中。巴基斯坦主要依靠铀用于裂变材料，自1999年以来，她也开始钚路线，调试Khushab反应堆。所有累积的巴基斯坦核武器库存总量不超过80 – 90.然而，国际上正在做出的一个案件是，巴基斯坦的总拥有量等于印度的或甚至超过印度。这种有组织的运动的联系不难理解，它的条款附加在“禁产条约”和希望巴基斯坦签署和批准条约并冻结与印度的不平等的支持者
This offensive concept has the seeds of seriously exacerbating South Asian security-dilemma dynamics. Such provocative overtures will undermine the current peace process and push the situation towards permanent tension. Secondly, such an initiative by Indians will accentuate the risk of escalation from conventional to nuclear realm and hence catastrophe for both. In the conventional realm, Cold Start compels Indian forces to attack Pakistan quickly, pushing an Indo-Pakistani dispute from the level of political crisis to outright conflict before the Indian government can be deterred from launching an offensive. Former Army Vice-Chief Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi considered to be the mastermind of Cold Start expects from Indian politicians a certain amount of political will and seriously the concept of limited war makes that political will more likely and situation much more precarious.  In short we can summarize that Cold Start doctrine will definitely compel Pakistan to rely on its strategic deterrent and plug the gaps by developing tactical nuclear weapons thus lowering the nuclear threshold and increasing instability.
Indian limitation of availability of indigenous uranium has also been addressed adequately under the said deal as she can now import uranium for her those reactors which are safeguarded thus freeing her to divert her indigenous material towards weaponization. The liberties granted to India under this deal constitute not only serious challenges to disarmament and nonproliferation but the widening gap in nuclear capabilities is also a serious threat to deterrence stability. No constraint has been placed on our right to construct new facilities for strategic purposes  .Unfortunately United States and the west knowingly or inadvertently are placing Pakistan in a nut cracker situation with regards to nuclear capability. Pakistan’s main reliance is Uranium for fissile material and since 1999 she has also embarked upon plutonium route with commissioning of Khushab reactor. All accumulative Pakistan’s total inventory of nuclear weapons is not more than 80 – 90. Nevertheless, a case is being made up in the international made that Pakistan’s total possession either equals that of India or even surpasses it. The linkage of such structured campaign is not difficult to understand and has its strings attached to the FMCT and the proponents who want Pakistan to sign and ratify the treaty and freeze inequality vis-à-vis India